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‘Run with the fox and hunt with the hounds’: Managerial Trade-Unionism 
and the British Association of Colliery Management, 1947–1994 
 
Andrew Perchard and Keith Gildart 
 
The British Association of Colliery Management was a very British 
institution in that it seemed to have the freedom both to run with 
the fox and hunt with the hounds … Although it never really joined 
in the dispute [1984–85 miners’ strike] when it came, it took 
some getting used to a situation in which people who clearly laid 
full claim to being representatives of ‘management’ could, and 
did, through their union, criticize that management.1 
Former National Coal Board (NCB) chairman Ian MacGregor’s criticism of 
the British Association of Colliery Management (BACM) reflected the 
breakdown between the two parties and their distinct outlooks on coal’s 
future in the 1980s. It was indicative of BACM leadership’s organizational 
and occupational locations; BACM was in many ways forged and 
sustained by nationalization. Many of its members were protective of the 
                                                        
1 I. MacGregor with R. Tyler, The Enemies Within: The Story of the Miners’ Strike, 




nationalized industry, while being occupationally and geographically 
socialized within coal communities.2  
This article examines the formation, development and politics of 
BACM. It explores BACM in relation to R. M. Blackburn’s concept of 
‘unionateness’, which proposed seven indicators of trade-union identity. 
The first three depend on a union’s role: in representing members in 
collective bargaining and protecting their rights; being separate from 
employers so that it can represent members independently; and 
willingness to use industrial action.3 The article also considers how 
BACM’s politics was informed by the changing role and identity of 
managers who, like colliery deputies and overmen, have been largely 
neglected in coal industry historiography.4 It considers debates around 
the growth of managerial trade-unionism, building on a literature that 
                                                        
2 A. Perchard and J. Phillips, ‘Transgressing the Moral Economy: Wheelerism and 
Management of the Nationalized Coal Industry in Scotland’, Contemporary British 
History (CBH) 25:3 (2011), pp. 387–405. 
3 The remaining points are being registered as a trade union; declaring to be a union; 
affiliation to the Trades Union Congress (TUC); and affiliation to the Labour Party: 
R. M. Blackburn, Union Character and Social Class: A Study of White-collar 
Unionism (Batsford: 1967), p. 18. 
4 I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, ‘Colliery Managers and Nationalization: The Experience 
in South Wales’, Business History 34:4 (1992), pp. 59–78; A. Perchard, The Mine 
Management Professions in the Twentieth-Century Scottish Coal Mining Industry 




gradually disappeared as the phenomenon it was studying declined.5 It 
questions characterizations of managers and white-collar trade unions. 
                                                        
5 B. J. McCormick, ‘Managerial Unionism in the Coal Industry’, British Journal of 
Sociology (BJS) 11:4 (1960), pp. 356–69; G. S. Bain, ‘The Growth of White-Collar 
Unionism in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations (BJIR) 4:3 (1966), pp. 
304–55; H. Hartmann, ‘Managerial Employees – New Participants in Industrial 
Relations’, BJIR 12:2 (1974), pp. 57–65; A. J. Arthurs, ‘Managerial Unionism in the 
Coal, Steel and Electricity Supply Industries’ (MA, University of Warwick: 1975); H. 
Gospel, ‘European Managerial Unions: An Early Assessment’, Industrial Relations 
17:3 (1978), pp. 360–71; W. R. Garside and H. F. Gospel, ‘Employers and Managers: 
Their Organizational Structure and Changing Industrial Relations’, in C. J. Wrigley 
(ed.), A History of British Industrial Relations 1875–1914 (Harvester Press, Brighton: 
1982), pp. 99–115; A. J. Arthurs, ‘Managerial Trade Unionism’, Journal of Industrial 
Relations 25 (1983), pp. 140–52; G. Bamber, Militant Managers? Managerial 
Unionism and Industrial Relations (Gower, Aldershot: 1986); E. Snape and G. 
Bamber, ‘Managerial and Professional Employees: Conceptualising Union Strategies 
and Structures’, BJIR 27:1 (1989), pp. 93–110; C. Wrigley, ‘From ASSET to 
ASTMS: An Example of White-Collar Union Growth in the 1960s’, Historical 
Studies in Industrial Relations 7 (1999), pp. 57–74; J. Melling, ‘Managing the White-
Collar Union: Salaried Staff, Trade Union Leadership, and the Politics of Organised 
Labour in Postwar Britain, c. 1950–1968’, International Review of Social History 
(IRSH) 48 (2003), pp. 245–71; idem, ‘Leading the White-Collar Union: Clive Jenkins, 
the Management of Trade-Union Officers, and the Politics of the British Labour 




Specifically, and alongside work by Joseph Melling on the Association of 
Supervisory Staffs, Executive and Technicians (ASSET), the article 
interrogates earlier claims by George Bain that white-collar workers were 
not motivated by social location or occupational characteristics.6  
Following work by Bob Carter and by Erik Olin Wright, we consider 
what BACM’s politics reveal about coal industry managerial employees’ 
identity. In particular, we deploy Wright’s concept of managers as 
occupying a ‘mediated class’ position of ‘contradictory’ locations.7 
MacGregor’s observations inadvertently alluded to this. In Wright’s words, 
managers are ‘organizational assets’ deployed by their employers: 
‘Professionals and technical employees […] can be seen as capitalistically 
exploited but skills exploiters. They thus constitute “contradictory 
locations within exploitation relations”.’8 These ‘locations’ were noted by 
Howard Gospel: 'Managers cannot be seen in simple terms as either 
employers or employees, managers or managed, buyers or sellers of 
labour. Instead, the majority …, in both the public and private sectors, 
partake simultaneously of both of these functions'.9 
                                                        
6 G. S. Bain, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1970), 
pp. 180–1; Melling, ‘Managing the White-Collar Union’, IRSH; idem, ‘Leading the 
White-Collar Union’, IRSH.  
7 B. Carter, Capitalism, Class Conflict and the New Middle Class (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul: 1985); E. O. Wright, ‘Rethinking, Once Again, the Concept of Class 
Structure’, in J. R. Hall (ed.), Reworking Class (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY: 
1997), pp. 41–72.  
8 Ibid., pp. 41, 66. 




We also consider colliery managers’ moral economic position within 
the changing political economy of post-war Britain. As Andrew Sayer 
observes, ‘to some extent, moral–political values regarding economic 
activities and responsibilities co-evolve with economic systems’.10 During 
the era of coal nationalization (1947–94), Britain’s political economic 
order changed. Jim Tomlinson has argued that the 1945–70 period 
between 1945 and 1970 saw the successful reassertion of the primacy of 
moral economy over political economy, for the first time since the 
eighteenth century.11 The Conservative administrations after 1979 
prioritized the market over the moral economy, specifically, in Margaret 
Thatcher’s words, targeting the ‘public service ethos’.12  
 The pre-eminent scholar of ‘moral economy’, Edward Thompson 
remarked upon this changing context:  
When I first published ‘The Moral Economy’, ‘the market’ was not flying 
as high in the ideological firmament as it is today. In the 1970s 
something called ‘modernisation theory’ swept through some 
undefended minds in Western academies, and subsequently the 
                                                        
10 A. Sayer, ‘Moral Economy and Political Economy’, Studies in Political Economy 
61 (2000), p. 81. 
11 J. Tomlinson, ‘Re-inventing the “Moral Economy” in Post-war Britain’, Historical 
Research 84 (2011), pp. 356–73. 
12 R. Samuel, Island Stories Unravelling Britain (Verso: 1996);  J. Tomlinson, ‘Mrs 
Thatcher’s Economic Adventurism, 1979–1981, and its Political Consequences’, 




celebration of ‘the market economy’ has become triumphal and almost 
universal.13  
Within this macro political economic narrative, there was, of course, 
nuance, historical contingency and complexity. As Tomlinson also noted, 
Keynesian attitudes remained resolute in some quarters, especially in the 
public sector.14  
Yet beneath a commitment to a ‘public service ethos’ in 
nationalized industries, initiatives to increase centralized control of 
management functions created tensions between layers of 
management.15 In coal, the imposition of centralized production targets, 
concentration of production on capital-intensive faces, and the industry’s 
contraction, increased tensions between attempts at a unitary 
management process and local control (and ultimately the industry’s 
survival based on more moral economic arguments). Within this, collieries 
were viewed by some managers, and miners, as collective assets upon 
which occupational communities, and the workforce, relied. Almost 
                                                        
13 E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common (Penguin: 1993), p. 267; see idem, ‘The 
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 18th Century’, Past & Present 50 (1971), 
pp. 76–136. 
14 J. Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of 
Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit (Oxford University Press: 2017).  
15 Acton Society Trust, Management under Nationalisation: Studies in 
Decentralisation (Acton Society Trust: 1953). T. Strangleman, Work Identity at the 
End of the Line? Privatisation and Culture Change in the UK Rail Industry (Palgrave: 
2004), p. 59, observed in British Rail, especially from the 1960s, similar tensions over 
whether ‘management represented a generic practice or one that was dependent on the 




inevitably managers held a range of opinions on nationalization.16 To a 
certain degree, these ‘moral economic’ arguments were associated with 
generational differences: the early leaders (1947–late 1950s) contrasted 
with their successors (see later for details).17 Differing political economic 
outlooks (for example, between MacGregor and Phillip Weekes, the NCB 
South Wales Area director in the 1980s) were also shaped by 
geographical location, background and experience. The space within 
which BACM operated was also subject to balancing different coalfield 
traditions. This formed the backdrop to BACM’s politics, strategy and 
tactics.  
 The wider relevance of a study of BACM is underlined both by the 
scale and importance of Britain’s nationalized coal industry, as well as its 
professionalization of management and recognition of a managerial union. 
In the 1950s, the NCB was Europe’s largest single employer, with an 
output almost matching that of the European Coal and Steel 
Community.18 Established in 1947 to represent the industry’s managerial 
personnel, BACM was a new experiment in UK industrial relations. 
                                                        
16 Perchard, Mine Management Professions; J. Phillips,  Collieries, Communities and 
the Miners’ Strike in Scotland, 1984–85 (Manchester University Press: 2012); 
Perchard and Phillips, ‘Transgressing the Moral Economy’, CBH. 
17 J. Phillips, ‘Economic Direction and Generational Change in Twentieth-Century 
Britain: The Case of the Scottish Coalfields’, English Hisorical Review (EHR) 557 
(2017), pp. 885–911. 
18 L. Hannah, ‘The Economic Consequences of the State Ownership of Industry, 
1945–1990’, in R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds), The Economic History of Britain 
since 1700, Vol. 3: 1939 –1992 (Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 168; M. 
Chick, Electricity and Energy Policy in Britain, France and the United States since 




Nationalization and professionalization of management formed and 
shaped the union.19  
Managers have remained largely absent in coal industry literature. 
At best, they have been a homogenous grouping; at worst, characterized 
as shady villains or the ‘same crew in different jerseys’.20 In some cases, 
it was a well-deserved reputation, but a crude characterization of a 
complex body motivated by a variety of factors: 
 
Their individualistic, pro-employer orientation stemmed from the 
scattered nature of the coal industry, the small size and heterogeneous 
nature of the managerial unit at collieries, promotion possibilities which 
broke down group solidarity and the resistance of the coal-owners to 
trade unionism among their staffs.21 
 
                                                        
19 Snape and Bamber, ‘Managerial and Professional Employees’, BJ IR. 
20 The same point is made by I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, ‘Industrial Relationships 
and Nationalization in the South Wales Coalmining Industry’ (Ph.D, University of 
Cambridge: 1990), p. 341. For example: R. Page Arnot, A History of the Scottish 
Miners (Allen and Unwin: 1955), pp. 278–91; L. Cooney and A. Maxwell, No More 
Bings in Benarty: An Account of the Rise and Fall of Mining in the Benarty Area of 
Fife, and its Influence on the People who Lived There (Benarty Mining Heritage 
Group, Ballingry: 1992); H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed: A History of the South 
Wales Miners in the Twentieth Century (University of Wales Press, Cardiff: 1998; 
revised edn), pp. 436–7. For exceptions, see Zweiniger-Bargielowska, ‘Colliery 
Managers and Nationalization’, Bus. Hist.; Perchard, Mine Management Professions; 
A. Perchard and J. Phillips, ‘Transgressing the Moral Economy’, CBH.  




As Andrew Perchard has illustrated, even prior to nationalization, this 
characterization requires qualification. Many managerial employees had 
been isolated (poorly paid and educated, and with low labour market 
mobility and lacking in social capital), but were increasingly vocal in 
criticisms of their conditions and how the industry was run by private 
companies.22 The paucity of investment in managers’ education was 
raised well into nationalization.23 And yet, as Barry Supple has argued, 
the decision to nationalize the industry, resulted, partly, from the ‘tension 
between colliery managers who wished to plough resources into 
development and directors who were reluctant to find more money or 
give up available profits.’24 Nina Fishman claimed that ‘“progressive” 
managers’ support for radical change … ensured nationalisation was well 
received by public opinion.’25  
 BACM’s importance extends beyond the coal industry. Its members 
were ‘professional functionaries’ in the ‘responsible society’, in which the 
Labour government placed so much faith and sought to accommodate. 
They exemplified ‘managerial workers, dependent upon organization 
                                                        
22 Perchard, Mine Management Professions. 
23 National Coal Board (NCB), Report of the Advisory Committee on Organisation 
(NCB: 1955), para. 38.   
24 B. Supple, The History of the British Coal Industry, Vol. 4. 1913–1946: The 
Political Economy of Decline (Clarendon Press: 1987), pp. 403–4. 
25 N. Fishman, ‘The Beginning of the Beginning: The National Union of Mineworkers 
and Nationalisation’, in A. Campbell, N. Fishman and D. Howell (eds), Miners, 




asset’ who have remained ‘one of the great mysteries of British history’.26 
If nationalization can be interpreted as a crowning peak for ‘the rise of 
the professional society’ – rather than the ‘commanding heights’ of a 
socialist vision – it was also fundamental to granting an independent 
voice to the technocratic expert; by 1980, one-quarter of British 
managers were union members, of these 60% were in the public sector.27  
 
The politics of BACM 
 
Formed in August 1947 – from the merger of the 7,000-strong British 
Association of Colliery Officials and Staff and the colliery under-managers’ 
association – BACM was by no means the pre-eminent ‘experiment’ that 
its president claimed for it.28  
 The Electrical Power Engineers’ Association (EPEA) had represented 
managerial and professional employees in power generation from 1913; 
and ASSET, organizing managers, higher technicians and professionals in 
engineering, was recognized by the Engineering Employers’ Federation in 
                                                        
26 M. Savage, J. Barlow, P. Dickens and T. Fielding, Property, Bureaucracy and 
Culture: Middle-class Formation in Contemporary Britain (Routledge: 1992), p. 49. 
27 Bamber, Militant Managers?, pp. 7–8. 
28 BACM, National News Letter, 21 January 1948, p. 5, BACM-TEAM offices, 
Doncaster (now archived at University of Nottingham; McCormick, ‘Managerial 




1944.29 The emergence of managerial trade-unionism was heavily 
dependent on employer recognition and union density. It is not surprising 
that density among managerial employees was highest in the nationalized 
industries, where a separate voice for managers was enshrined in the 
formal machinery of arbitration.30  
 Coal industry professionals and managers had long been organized 
into professional associations – the National Association of Colliery 
Managers (NACM) (formed 1887) and the Institution of Mining Engineers 
(1889), among others – but these principally focused on technical matters 
and safety. Their members included coal owners and agents, alongside 
colliery managers and under-managers. Nevertheless, NACM attempted 
(fruitlessly) to negotiate wage claims for managers in the 1920s. Coal 
owners side-lined NACM and reduced managers’ wages after the 1921 
miners’ lockout. By the 1930s and 1940s, the tensions within NACM were 
all too visible, and it haemorrhaged members. This helps to explain the 
enthusiasm among some managers for nationalization and the formation 
of a new body to represent them over pay and conditions, as well as 
generational differences.31  
                                                        
29 Arthurs, ‘Managerial Unionism’, pp. 2–3; J. Slinn, Engineers in Power. 75 years of 
the EPEA (Lawrence & Wishart: 1989); C. Wrigley, British Trade Unions since 1933 
(Cambridge University Press: 2002), p. 22.  
30 Wrigley, British Trade Unions, pp. 18–39; H. Gospel, ‘European Managerial 
Unions’, Ind. Relns; Snape and Bamber, ‘Managerial and Professional Employees’, 
BJIR; Bain, Growth of White-Collar Unionism. 




 Underlying the transformation of management within the industry 
was a sense that ‘moral imperatives’, rather than ‘simple market 
advantage’, be placed ‘at the centre of discussion of what are traditionally 
thought to be “economic issues”’.32 Unlike the empty rhetoric of the 
Mining Association of Great Britain (the coal owners’ body before 
nationalization), which had promised ‘to raise the profession of mining 
engineers to a level at least equal to that of any other scientific and 
technical profession’, the NCB transformed managers’ status.33 Managers 
saw an immediate improvement in salaries, conditions, and opportunities 
for professional development. Moreover, they now had an independent 
voice, distinct from the professional associations. This initiative owed 
much to the commitment and support of Labour government ministers.34 
The NCB’s treatment of managerial employees, which contrasted sharply 
with the private companies, helps to explain the increasing, if qualified, 
support among many mine management professionals for nationalization.  
                                                        
32  J. Tomlinson, ‘Re-inventing the “Moral Economy”’, Hist. Res., p. 361; N. Tiratsoo 
and J.Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention: Labour 1939–1951 
(Routledge: 1993), pp. 44–9, 57, and 111–12.   
33 BACM, National News Letter 2 (February 1948), pp. 1 and 4; ibid. 6 (August 
1948), p. 2; ibid. 15 (May 1951), p. 4; Minutes of the BACM, National Joint Council 
(NJC), 30 November 1958; Q. Outram, ‘Class Warriors: The Coal Owners’, in J. 
McIlroy, A. Campbell and K. Gildart (eds), Industrial Politics and the 1926 Mining 
Lockout: The Struggle for Dignity (University of Wales Press, Cardiff: 2004), p. 117; 
Perchard, Mine Management Professions, pp. 186–203, 402–3.  
34 Minutes of meeting between Major Walton-Brown and Major Anderson, BACM 
national executive committee (NEC), and Lord Hyndley, Sir Arthur Street, and R. G. 
C. Cowe, NCB, 23 April 1947; minutes of meeting between BACM and NUM, 5 




Managerial identity was also shaped by the NCB’s organizational 
culture. When nationalizing coal, the Labour government drew on 
different models. Foremost was Herbert Morrison’s 1933 plans for 
socialized transport. He envisaged a public corporation, which ‘must be 
no mere capitalist business’, staffed by a board and officers, ‘in the 
splendid tradition of public service, loyalty and incorruptibility in the 
British Civil Service’, who ‘must regard themselves as the high 
custodians of the public interest’.35 Those managing these corporations 
should be selected ‘primarily on suitable grounds of competence’, ‘must 
graduate from within that industry’, and embrace public service.36 
‘Socialism’, as a Labour Party pamphlet declared, meant ‘carrying the 
managerial revolution to its logical conclusion’. This was to be overseen 
by a ‘progressive and professional’ modern management. As both Ross 
McKibbin and Mike Savage observe, this technocratic vision sold 
‘socialism’ to the middle class, although the class location of mine 
management professionals remained complex and contestable.37  
                                                        
35 E. Shinwell, Conflict without Malice (Odhams: 1955), pp. 172–3; H. Morrison, 
Socialisation and Transport: The Organisation of Socialised Industries with 
Particular Reference to the London Passenger Transport Bill (Constable: 1933), pp. 
133 and 156–7. 
36 Morrison, Socialisation and Transport, pp. 145, 157–60, and 168. 
37 ‘Linicus’ in the Labour Party’s Vote Labour? Why? (1945), quoted in Tiratsoo and 
Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency, p. 49; R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 
1918–1951 (Oxford University Press: 2000), pp. 68–9; Savage, ‘Affluence and Social 
Change in the Making of Technocratic Middle-Class Identities: Britain, 1939-55’, 




Clement Attlee’s immediate post-war administrations were 
committed to the professionalization of management, considered 
inextricably linked to the modernization of the economy. In part, this was 
informed by the Anglo-American Productivity Council.38 Labour ministers 
and the NCB sought to build an esprit de corps, through integrated 
technical and management education. NCB senior managers were initially 
enrolled at the Administrative Staff College at Henley, which educated 
senior civil servants, as well as managers from other nationalized 
industries and leading British companies, with standards set by the new 
British Institute of Management.  
 Colliery managers were educated through the NCB staff college, 
established in the late 1950s, charged with ‘developing and unifying 
management in the industry’.39 Education was delivered by NCB staff and 
university mining departments. This greater professionalization was also 
prompted from within management, notably by the former chief inspector 
of mines, NCB board member, and prominent mining engineer, Sir Andrew 
Bryan, who became BACM’s first interim president.40 Whether this 
inculcated, as Jonathan and Ruth Winterton detected, a ‘managerial 
unitary philosophy’ within the NCB is debatable, given experiences 
                                                        
38 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency; A. Carew, Labour under the 
Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management 
Science (Manchester University Press:1987). 
39 J. B. Platt and M. B. Brodie, ‘Management in the British Coal Mining Industry and 
the Rôle of the University Mining Departments’, Management International 4:2 
(1964), p. 37. 




leavened by location, occupation, personal outlook, and generational 
differences.41  
 The legacy of the role and status of managers in the private 
industry, as well as opportunities and tensions arising from 
nationalization, were reflected in the divisions within BACM over 
managerial functions and status, and affiliation to the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC). Changing energy policy and the colliery-closure 
programme saw a shift in BACM politics, including fostering alliances 
across mining unions. These issues highlighted the contested locations 
occupied by managers and the ‘moral choices’ made by them. This shift in 
culture illustrates the transition from ‘staff association’ to a managerial 
‘closed union’,42 reflected in the background, politics and style of BACM’s 
officers. 
 Its changing politics were evidenced by the contrast between the 
first (permanent) national president, Major Stanley Walton-Brown (1947–
56), and general secretary Major Robin W. Anderson (1947–59), and the 
later leadership of national president Jim Bullock (1956–69) and general 
secretary George Tyler (1959–73). Walton-Brown and Anderson were 
doubtless in Bullock’s mind when he observed that colliery managers and 
mining engineers were ‘largely Conservative in outlook’ and ‘resented 
                                                        
41 J. and R. Winterton, ‘Production, Politics and Technological Development: British 
Coal Mining in the Twentieth Century’, in J. Melling and A. McKinlay (eds), 
Management, Labour and Industrial Politics in Modern Europe: The Quest for 
Productivity Growth in the Twentieth Century (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 1996), p. 
131. 




nationalization at its outset’.43 They embodied this difficult transition from 
professional association to managerial trade union and the tensions 
among the mine management professions. As national president of NACM 
in 1939–40, Walton-Brown had declared that he hoped that the then 
ongoing statutory plans for amalgamations of colliery companies would 
not ‘disturb the happy relations between individual owners, agents and 
managers.’44 This reflected his position as an ‘owner-manager’ and the 
distinctions between those and ‘employee-managers’ under private 
control, as evidence to the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines 
(1936–38) and outbursts to the industry periodicals had shown.45 
 In contrast, Bullock and Tyler’s tenure marked a watershed in the 
union’s development, coinciding with the growing crisis in the industry as 
governments looked to other energy sources, the escalating colliery-
closure programme, and the national strikes in the early 1970s. Bullock 
and Tyler laid the foundations for their successors – Charles Alexander, 
Norman Schofield, Doug Bulmer, and Alan Wilson.  
 Walton-Brown and Anderson represented a certain type of 
shareholder-manager who had vested financial interests in the private 
coal companies and had occupied senior positions. Walton-Brown spent 
most of his working life in Northumberland where his father had been a 
senior mining engineer. At the time of nationalization, he was managing-
director of the Seghill Colliery Company and had been vice-chairman of 
the Northumberland Coal Owners’ Association. He was also a district and 
                                                        
43 BACM, National News Letter 55 (June 1961), p. 3. 
44 Transactions of the National Association of Colliery Managers 37 (1940),  p. 36. 




county councillor, magistrate, and president of his local Conservative 
Association.46 Walton-Brown and Anderson were neither ‘natural’ trade-
unionists nor enthusiasts for nationalization; they approached their 
relationship with the NCB with a mixture of private deference and public 
belligerence. Yet, for all the indignation, in the closed environment of their 
first meeting with the NCB, BACM had pledged to be a ‘very necessary 
help to the Board’, and ‘no longer a nuisance’.47 In essence Walton-Brown 
and Anderson represented attitudes that continued over from the private 
industry; their ‘contradictory location’ was in having to continue as 
managers within a nationalized industry. 
 Walton-Brown’s views were made clear in public pronouncements. 
In 1953 he declared: ‘In a monopolistic industry, the ideas of a National 
Coal Board and their managers as employees no longer coincide to the 
same extent as … under the former regime’.48 Although some managers 
agreed, others tentatively embraced nationalization.49 The dominance of 
former shareholder-managers, and the entrenched sense of hierarchy 
among others, had a profound effect on the executive bodies within 
                                                        
46 Mining Engineer 120 (1960), pp. 157–8; ‘Stanley Walton-Brown’, North of 
England Mining Institute: https://mininginstitute.org.uk/about-us/past-presidents-of-
the-institute/stanley-walton-brown/ ; J. Bullock, Them and Us (Souvenir Press, 
London: 1972), p. 147. 
47 BACM, NEC, minutes of meeting of Walton-Brown and Anderson (BACM) with 
Lord Hyndley, Sir Arthur Street and Mr. R. G. C. Cowe (NCB), 23 April 1947. 
48 BACM, National News Letter 24 (July 1953), p. 10; BACM, NEC, 20 September 
1947. 
49 Perchard, Mine Management Professions; Zweiniger-Bargielowska, ‘Colliery 




BACM. Tensions increased between the ‘mining groups’ (colliery 
managers, mining engineers and senior production officials) and allied 
mining professionals (mining electrical and mechanical engineers, safety 
officers, and mines surveyors) over the dominance of the national 
executive and the national joint council (NJC). As late as 1975, three of 
BACM’s nine vocational groups, representing half of its membership, were 
not represented on the twelve-person NJC. In contrast, the ‘mining 
groups’, representing 18% of members, held 39% of the seats on the 
executive and 42% on the NJC.50 This was reflected at branch level; 
‘mining groups’ dominated the Scottish, Durham, and Northern branches 
until the 1970s,51 and inculcated BACM’s initial conservatism at national 
level. The reorganization of managerial functions and the growing 
confidence among other groups within BACM was to challenge this 
hegemony.  
 Much BACM business initially was opposing the replacement of 
perquisites traditionally offered to managers with a more transparent 
salary structure and allowances. While the elimination of perquisites (a 
particular furore arose over Christmas turkeys) saw some loss of earnings 
in the early 1950s, managerial grades experienced dramatic 
improvements in pay, conditions, prospects and representation compared 
to under private ownership.52 In 1947, the NCB introduced a national 
                                                        
50 Arthurs, ‘Managerial Unionism’, p. 8. 
51 BACM, National News Letter 35 (May 1956), p. 6; of BACM, Durham & Northern 
branch minutes, 1947–1969, AS.ACM (temporary accession code), Tyne & Wear 
Archives, Newcastle.  




salary scale for colliery managers ranging between £650 and £1,650 
(£24,170–£61,360 at 2017 real prices). After their 1951 settlement, the 
NCB agreed to a sliding range of £800–£1,250 (£23,880–£37,320 at 2017 
real prices) for managers of small collieries and £1,000–£1,650 (£29,860–
£49,260) for large. Between 1948 and 1951, under-managers’ wages rose 
from £700–£1,100 to £900–£1,200. 53 This was a legacy of the variation in 
pay offered by different colliery companies. The Lanarkshire Coal Masters’ 
Association, for example, had fixed colliery managers’ wages at £545 in 
1942 (£24,140 in 2017 real prices).54 So Lanarkshire colliery managers 
would have seen significant pay increases in real terms. Similarly, salaries 
for south Wales managers increased substantially after nationalization. 
However, managers at Bickershaw colliery in Lancashire complained that 
their salaries would be halved by the new scales.55 
 BACM’s relationship with the NCB was not aided initially by its 
attempts in Durham, Yorkshire and Scotland to recruit members of the 
National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers 
(NACODS) and the National Unon of Mineworkers (NUM). BACM received a 
rebuke from NCB chairman Lord Hyndley for ‘poaching … of a flagrant 
kind’.56 The bitterness of these disagreements was evident from Walton-
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Brown’s speech to the 1948 conference: ‘there has never been a time 
when the management and staff were so disgruntled … so ready to talk of 
industrial action’.57 His rancour, and capacity for fanciful exaggeration, 
was still evident in 1955: 
 
It is a far cry back to … 1947 when this Association commenced its 
task of putting the relationships between the Board and the Union on a 
firm and proper basis … [W]e were faced with an atmosphere created 
by the first Board whose conception of the Management Staff dated not 
merely back to feudal times but even further, perhaps even to the days 
of Rome, Egypt and Babylon when slaves might be seen but certainly 
not heard.58  
 
Prosecutions of managers under the Coal Mines Act 1911 continued 
to be contentious. Colliery managers’ complaints that they were held 
legally responsible for accidents, arising from withholding of vital 
investment to pits, while company agents and directors evaded 
responsibility, had gained more traction in the 1930s in the aftermath of 
the 1934 Gresford explosion and inquiry and in evidence to the 1936 
Royal Commission, and in the 1939 Valleyfield disaster. The same issues 
were highlighted over prosecutions of managers after the Castle 
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Knockshinnoch disaster in 1950. While the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 
introduced further clarification, acknowledging both the role of higher 
levels of management and the diffusion of management functions, colliery 
managers and under-managers bore the brunt of the responsibility. The 
shortcomings and inequities of this became more evident with the 
productivity drives from the late 1950s.59  
 In the vanguard of the mood for change were Bullock and Tyler, 
who could scarcely have been more different from their predecessors. 
Bullock was born into a household of miners. After leaving school aged 
thirteen, he worked as a miner, junior official, and under-manager, before 
becoming a colliery manager. He remained a Labour Party supporter, an 
advocate of nationalization and a committed trade-unionist.60 Tyler also 
came from a mining family, left school at fourteen to become an 
apprentice fitter, and worked for six years underground. He went on to 
study mining, when he discovered an interest in trade-unionism and social 
sciences, which he pursued at Nottingham and Oxford universities. During 
the 1930s and 1940s, Tyler worked with the South Wales Miners’ 
Federation, organizing holiday camps for unemployed miners. From 1947 
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he held numerous posts around the country for BACM.61 Their 
backgrounds were important in recommending them to many managers. 
As one former Scottish BACM official recalled: ‘Bullock was the best leader 
that BACM have ever had, and, yes, there was a change in the attitude of 
the management union … He came up, as you’ll know, from the pit … 
Brother, father, uncle Tom Cobley and all were miners. He was from a 
mining village and he was a hands-on man.’62  
 Bullock and Tyler forged a distinct and independent agenda for 
BACM; one that they argued was in keeping with their role as trade-
unionists. They highlighted the double standards implicit in the 
government’s granting of increases in salaries for board members while 
urging wage restraint from the mining unions.63 Breaking with Walton-
Brown and Anderson they were vocal in criticizing the failure of 
governments to alleviate the distress from the industry’s contraction and 
to develop a robust national fuel policy, and they worked with the NUM 
and NACODS to lobby against closures in the 1960s.64 This strategy 
found favour, coinciding with a 39% growth in BACM membership from 
around 12,000 in 1956 to a peak of 16,700 in 1964. By the 1970s, 
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BACM claimed a density of 95% among NCB managerial grades.65 While 
the declining fortunes of some coalfields and the specialization of 
management functions (and growth in allied management professions) 
in part explain the union’s shifting politics, Bullock and Tyler were 
praised in 1963 by the Durham branch chairman (a vocal critic): ‘a great 
tribute should be paid to Mr Bullock … despite the number of closures … 
not one single Member had actually been sacked … because of 
redundancy’.66  
Enduring malaise between the NCB and BACM was due to the 
perceived lack of consultation over production targets, colliery reviews 
and closures. Increasingly, the sense of alienation became visible both 
among individual managers and collectively through BACM. The growing 
sense among operational managers that they were subject to direction by 
national edict festered. Discontent grew over the subjugation of local 
managers to unrealistic, nationally devised productivity targets, 
victimization, forced early retirement, and redundancies. After NCB 
chairman Lord Robens lectured BACM members on the need for 
consultation at their 1963 annual conference, locally and nationally anger 
mounted over the board’s own failure to consult managers.67 BACM was 
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becoming more stridently independent and particularly critical of 
government by the 1960s over energy policy and colliery closures. This 
criticism extended to the government’s restriction of compensation for 
pneumoconiosis sufferers. BACM’s campaigning on this issue by the early 
1970s reflected a more moral economic viewpoint.68  
Such a viewpoint, and one able to unite BACM and other mining 
unions, was criticism of the absence of a well-conceived, long-term energy 
policy and the colliery closure programme and impact on coalfield 
communities. Under Sir James Bowman and then Robens, the industry 
contracted sharply, with 515 collieries closed and 411,200 jobs lost 
between 1958 and 1971.69 Despite their association with the colliery-
closure programme, Bowman and Robens sought to alleviate the effects. 
Robens also clashed publicly with Harold Wilson (Labour prime minister) 
when the latter, convinced of the dawn of the nuclear age and with cheap 
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oil supplies, wanted to speed up the industry’s contraction. Robens defied 
ministers by winning a coal contract with the Canadian multinational, 
Alcan, for its Lynemouth smelter in preference to electricity from the new 
generation Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGR), subsidized by 
government. This move pitted coal (representing old Labour) against 
Wilson’s vision of the technocratic ‘White Heat’ revolution. The Alcan 
contract won Robens few friends among his erstwhile Labour colleagues 
but, in marked contrast to his ebullient management style and the 1966 
National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) with the NUM, it won him 
admiration from managers and BACM.70  
The effects of the closure programme required a concerted 
campaign by the mining unions. In response to the loss of its members’ 
jobs, by the early 1960s BACM nationally was collaborating with the other 
mining unions.71 The indignation felt in some coalfields was captured by 
Michael McGahey, future NUM Scottish Area president and national vice-
president, in Ayrshire in 1966: ‘What we are experiencing is not the 
normal process of life of closing down exhausted pits but the deliberate, 
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premeditated murder of an industry’. 72Much the same language was used 
by Bullock in a 1969 documentary, visiting the Yorkshire mining village of 
Fryston where he lived and worked: ‘Closing a pit … means destroying a 
whole community … What touches us in mining families is that this 
destroys something that I don’t think will ever be built up again.’73 
Managers were personally affected by the closures as individuals 
and as part of occupational communities. By 1958–59, of the seventy 
managerial staff expected to be affected by the closure of thirty collieries 
in Scotland, the NCB divisional board could only guarantee posts for 
twenty-seven. A similar picture emerged in Cumberland and 
Northumberland: over the same period, most of the mine management 
staff affected by seven closures were not placed, demoted or given short-
term contracts mothballing the collieries. The case of the 39-year-old 
manager of Blackhill Colliery in Cumberland is indicative. After declaring 
that ‘we do not foresee alternative employment for this man in the 
immediate future’, the divisional board appointed him to salvage work. He 
finally found a demoted post as an under-manager at Woodhorn Colliery, 
only for this to be closed in 1961. He was offered another under-manager 
post after vigorous lobbying by his BACM branch. In another Cumberland 
case, a divisional board staff manager visited an assistant colliery agent in 
hospital to tell him that he was to be retired within three months. By 
September 1959, the Durham divisional board informed BACM that 
                                                        
72 Quoted in J.. Moore, Doon Valley Diary: The Critical Decade 1963–72 (J. Moore, 
Ayr: 1980), p. 36. 




sixteen members under retirement age, some only fifty-five years old, 
were to be made redundant.  
The rancour towards the NCB grew when it was found not to be 
honouring the 1953 agreement to maintain salary levels of those demoted 
or transferred because of closures. The refusal by the Minister of Power in 
1959 to change superannuation arrangements to make allowances for 
early retirement inflamed matters, with the Durham and Northumberland 
branches declaring: ‘when men have worked a lifetime in an industry so 
arduous and demanding as mining, they have a right to expect some 
restful leisure in their eventide’.74 Closures sometimes forged a united 
front between colliery management and the NUM, such as at Woodend in 
Lanarkshire (which fought a closure threat for three years before 
succumbing in 1965).75 
BACM was sharply critical of government policy, including the Fuel 
Policy White Paper of 1967. In 1970 it called for a national board to co-
ordinate energy resources and power supplies. Alexander told delegates at 
the union’s annual conference that ‘if there is to be some measure of 
stability in the power game in this country a strong over-riding body must 
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control its destiny’.76 Tyler spoke of the bleak future for coal without 
planning. He wanted, ‘as management, to be able to say honestly that we 
can guarantee a future to young men coming into the industry’.77 In the 
brief respite afforded by a renewed interest in coal, Alexander declared in 
1971: ‘this means there should be no more closures, with the normal 
exceptions of the few … shut because of exhaustion of reserves, or 
unexpected problems like insurmountable geological difficulties’.78  
Deploying arguments over security of supply (against the backdrop 
of delays in the UK’s much-feted new AGR nuclear-power stations and 
before the oil shock of 1973), the president restated in June 1972 that 
BACM was ‘opposed to closure’ on any other grounds than exhaustion of 
reserves or insurmountable financial difficulties, arguing that coal’s ‘value 
to the Nation must not be assessed in the context of short term and 
markets, but on the wider aspect of a future realisable asset’.79 Alexander 
admonished those in the press who took cheap shots, reminding them of 
what had been achieved; for example:  
It would be fair to say that the recovery of the nation depended 
upon the strength of the Mining Industry … Notwithstanding some 
failures, it had achieved this ‘in adversity’… against the forces of 
nature, against the equally perverse forces of government … and 
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against a public which is notoriously fickle … and is always prepared 
to drop an established and loyal service in favour of a modern 
gimmick.80   
The national strikes of 1972 and 1974, and NUM policy, symbolized rank-
and-file discontent, but the change in the NCB’s relationship with 
government also played a part. Derek Ezra, NCB chairman 1971–82 but 
without Robens’s political influence, came under pressure from a 
confrontational government.81 Notwithstanding bitterness over picket line 
conduct in 1972, BACM joined with the NUM and NACODS, in writing to 
the NCB to demand greater involvement, scrutiny and transparency in the 
review procedures for colliery closures.82 Alexander told the 1973 BACM 
conference:  
it ought to be part of the policy of any British Government to 
conserve any supplies of indigenous fuel over which it had 
absolute control. I also stated that it should sustain any industry 
which was actively engaged in the extraction and production of 
these sources of basic power in view of the situation which was 
developing in the world energy markets … I emphasised that our 
energies should be directed towards influencing the political body, 
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in conjunction with the Board and any of the other Unions in the 
Industry.83  
During the 1973–74 NUM overtime ban, and in agreement with the 
NUM, BACM members undertook extra duties to guard against flooding 
and fires in pits. While BACM remained critical of the dispute, this was 
directed equally forcefully at the government. Former general secretary 
Tyler warned the government to pay attention to miners’ concerns: ‘we 
are close enough to the pit head to know that the miners are not 
kidding’.84 A year later, the new president, Schofield, urged the 
government to maintain, ‘the right atmosphere in the pits’.85 The assault 
on the industry and mining communities – as well as the threat to 
managerial employees’ jobs – coalesced opinion among the mine 
management professions, able to rally against the ‘outsider’ threatening 
their industry. The depth of feeling among managers expressed during the 
1984–85 strike belied two decades of tensions. This was an attack not just 
on the industry (and significantly NCB organizational culture) and coalfield 
communities, but also on their identity as individuals who had built their 
careers in coal.  
 If BACM’s preoccupation had initially been ‘the protection of 
members’ occupational interests’ its tactics shifted markedly under Bullock 
and Tyler, highlighting generational, as well as locational, differences 
between them and the early leadership of the union and the contested 
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nature of managers’ positions.86 This was primarily shaped by pragmatism 
and the experience of operating within the wider post-war arena of 
industrial relations, as well as the NCB conciliation and arbitration 
mechanisms. Bullock and Tyler utilized and recognized the limitations of 
‘discursive confrontation’. They distinguished between the success of (and 
benefits accrued by) managerial unions that extended their sphere of 
influence through forums like the TUC and those which foundered in 
professional isolation.87 This change reflected the determination of key 
figures at national and branch levels to transform BACM’s outlook. It also 
reflected a more moral economic viewpoint, which became particularly 
visible in campaigns to stem the industry’s contraction. Changes in UK 
energy policy and the industrial politics of coal brought Bullock and Tyler’s 
successors into ever more vocal condemnation of government policy and, 
by the 1980s, into open conflict with MacGregor and the Conservative 
governments of Thatcher and John Major. BACM’s claims to trade-
unionism were to be markedly tested by debates over such issues as 
strike cover and TUC affiliation. 
 
Trade Unionism and Industrial Action 
No single issue illustrated the complexities and ‘contradictory locations 
within exploitation relations’ of BACM’s members as its position over 
industrial action. BACM remained opposed to striking – though, from the 
first annual meeting in 1947, it agreed that, in the event of industrial 
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action, ‘members ought not to do the work of other bodies on strike, 
except in matters involving the safety of the pit’.88 This was unsuccessfully 
challenged in 1952 when the South Western branch wanted the rules 
amended to ‘do everything in their power in the interests of safety [and] 
keep everything going.’89 BACM policy was tested during the 1972 strike. 
The union remained steadfast: ‘Members ought not to do the work of 
strikers except in matters involving the safety of the pit in its strict and 
proper sense’ (added emphasis).90  
BACM sympathized with the NUM and laid the fault at Robens’s door 
for what it perceived to be the wages consequences of the NPLA’s 
introduction in 1966.91 BACM and the NUM had agreed on safety cover in 
the event of official industrial action two years previously.92 Its 
enforcement at local level led to claims of illegal working and counter-
claims of intimidation by pickets, contrary to agreements, concluding with 
an exchange between NUM general secretary Lawrence Daly and Tyler. 
Daly wrote to BACM after reports that its members had been flouting the 
rules over strike cover and producing coal. Tyler rebutted these and 
questioned the behaviour of pickets to BACM and NACODS members. 
Tyler couched BACM’s position around the long-term survival of pits, 
although he admitted that finance staff had been breaking the agreement: 
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Do you really expect our members to allow a pit to be ruined and made 
unfit for work when the strike is over? I know that some of your 
members have publicly declared that they would prefer that to happen, 
rather than to compromise on pay claims … Whatever our members are 
doing at pits, they are not producing coal. Any activity they are 
undertaking is equally in the interests of your members as ours 
because it would be a very hollow victory indeed if, as a result of the 
strike, some pits (and it could be many) are never able to open 
again.93   
Alexander, Bullock’s successor as national president, also exhibited a 
moral economic approach; he justified safety cover while expressing 
indignation over pickets’ tactics.94 He concluded with management’s 
responsibility in a nationalized industry by drawing on the collective 
memory of the Second World War: ’Because we are management we are 
conscious that a large part of the national asset is being severely 
damaged and we accept our responsibility by our attempts to minimise 
that damage.’95  
His reaction captured the conflict in being a manager and a trade-
unionist. Alexander, who had served in the war, used language similar to 
many managers of his generation who took issue with what they saw as 
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the unruliness of young miners on the picket lines.96 He was articulating in 
a proprietorial sense what Morrison’s notion of managers as ‘custodians of 
the public interest’; and he also reflected the dislocation that was evident 
between different generations of miners.97 What proved even more 
contentious for BACM was ambiguity over unofficial action, with rules left 
purposefully vague. This allowed BACM members to be called upon to 
undertake duties – in the event of unofficial action – beyond those 
necessary for safety as long as consultation took place between the NCB 
and BACM, and competency and job demarcation were met. During a pit 
deputies’ strike in the east midlands in 1956, BACM members were 
instructed to ‘help the board as far as possible’, but that ‘no manager or 
undermanager should act as a deputy’.  
Divisions over BACM’s position on industrial action were also 
evident during a consultation over policy in 1964. While most branches 
accepted the status quo, the Scottish, Northumberland and Durham, and 
North Western branches urged a stronger statement. In particular, they 
expressed concern that ‘members should not be strike-breakers’. 
Alexander, the then Scottish branch secretary, insisted that ‘members 
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should refuse to undertake work other than their normal duties’.98 In 
1966, BACM rules were flouted when engineers were directed to carry out 
emergency tasks, which they were not qualified to undertake, and without 
prior consultation. It was the opacity of BACM’s position on this that led to 
a motion at the 1975 conference to clarify the rules to ensure that 
members could not be directed to maintain production in the event of a 
strike; this was rejected by a sizeable majority.99  
The executive had issued a policy in 1964 that any task undertaken 
should not contravene safety regulations and not be carried out by 
unqualified officials. Nevertheless, it ‘recommended’ that administrative 
staff at area and divisional levels should ‘help the Board, taking into 
account the conditions’, while directing members to ‘refuse to undertake 
work other than their normal duties unless consultation has taken 
place.’100 During unofficial action at Lynemouth in Northumberland in 
1968, the NCB asked BACM for cover. The branch had agreed, on the 
understanding that it was voluntary, that members not be asked to cover 
NUM or Colliery Officials and Staff Association (COSA) jobs, and that it be 
limited to one weekend. All except one of the colliery engineers agreed. At 
a subsequent meeting ‘where the Union’s policy had come under fire’, 
some deputy engineers, sympathetic to the NUM claim, entered into a 
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fierce debate with the branch secretary. He responded: ‘management 
officials who accepted management privileges had to accept management 
responsibilities’.101 These incidents captured the compromised position 
BACM found itself in during unofficial action. The failed 1975 attempt to 
change the policy suggests that the proposers felt morally compelled to 
challenge a ruling which could be used to direct them to continue 
production. As the clash over safety cover between BACM Scottish officials 
and area director Albert Wheeler during the 1984–85 strike illustrated, 
BACM policy on industrial action continued to be divisive.102  
BACM’s position on this illustrated characteristic tensions for 
managerial and white-collar unions and the managers’ ‘contradictory 
locations’. Policy on strike cover also exposed the union’s ‘high wire’ 
balancing act to maintain some semblance of unity, with differing stances 
adopted in different coalfields. (The NUM similarly contended with the 
varied politics and traditions of the various coalfields.)103 The moral 
arguments deployed by the BACM leadership in the early 1970s mirrored 
those they advanced against premature closures and UK energy policy. 
Divisions within management over future visions for the industry would be 
acute after 1979, particularly after MacGregor’s appointment in 1983 as 
NCB chairman. 
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The legacy of Bullock and Tyler was evident also in BACM joining 
the TUC. Bullock was unequivocal: ‘My mind has always been clear that 
any union that wanted to be a union in spirit as well as in name should 
join the TUC’.104 BACM’s research officer, G. E. C. Paton, sought to allay 
fears by stressing the TUC’s politically independent nature, as well as the 
benefits from membership. This was designed to counteract the 
substantial opposition but also reflected the leadership’s concerns not to 
affect its bargaining position with Conservative governments.105 BACM did 
eventually join the TUC, a key characteristic of ‘unionateness’. But, as 
with many other managerial, and white-collar, unions, clearly many 
members were suspicious of joining a body seen as dominated by unions 
with clear political affiliations.  
 Despite support for TUC affiliation from the Scottish, east midlands and 
London branches, Bullock and Tyler faced robust opposition. In 1964, the 
Durham and Northumberland branch urged its members to vote against 
because ‘The BACM is an Association which caters for Management Grades 
and there are other Unions which are not affiliated to the TUC, which, whilst 
not perhaps being as wholly management in outlook as we are, nevertheless, 
also cater for senior officials.’106 
 This reflected the conservatism of that branch, with close ties to 
Walton-Brown, and the contested position of BACM’s managers. Paton 
had tried to address this, adapting the statement of the general 
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secretary of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants to its members: 
‘In the event of the Society’s affiliation to the TUC, this would not in the 
slightest way affect the position of a member of the Executive Class 
occupying a managerial position, who would continue to adopt a wholly 
impartial attitude to public issues’. 107 The Durham and Northumberland 
branch’s circular, and the sharp rebuke from Tyler, highlighted regional 
differences. The vote in September 1964 elicited a low response (37%), 
with only 37% in favour. The following year, Bullock and Tyler addressed 
concerns, re-emphasizing the union’s outlook and the changing politics 
of the TUC: 
  
The TUC itself is concentrating increasingly upon economic and social 
questions and the growing influence of affiliated black-coated unions 
will help to ensure that in time purely political questions are left to 
political parties. In the event of affiliation the Society will react to 
questions as it does now according to how these affect our relationship 
with the Government and employer.108 
 
Bullock and Tyler highlighted benefits of membership –access to 
corporatist bodies such as the National Economic Development Council – 
giving BACM a greater voice in the industry’s future. One critic accused 
them of being ‘out of touch’ with the membership, arguing that affiliation 
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would embroil them in debates about Rhodesia and Britain’s potential 
involvement in the Vietnam war.109  
 By the time Bullock and Tyler had stepped down, BACM was still 
deeply divided over TUC affiliation; a vote in 1970 returned 58% against. 
By 1975, the majority of the executive supported affiliation. There are a 
number of explanations for this change of heart: the UK’s entry into 
European Economic Community (in 1973) and the platform that the TUC 
provided for representing the industry’s long-term interest; concerns over 
energy policy and the future of the industry; and the Conservative 
government was urging BACM and the First Division Association 
(representing the senior civil service) to join to ‘strengthen the 
representatives of the TUC’ (to counteract the block votes of the manual 
unions and the left). In 1976 a majority voted in favour (joining in 
1977).110  
BACM’s affiliation severely weakened attempts, supported by some 
Conservative MPs, to create a separate forum for managerial unions. This 
aimed to forge a Managerial and Professional Group (MPG) bringing 
together the Association of Managerial and Professional Staffs (AMPS) and 
the UK Association of Professional Engineers (UKAPE), along with fourteen 
other unions and associations (including the British Medical Association). 
The MPG was further weakened when the Steel Industry Managers’ 
Association (SIMA), UKAPE and AMPS all merged into the TUC-affiliated 
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Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union. Within the 
TUC, managers’ unions campaigned for a specific section. In the 1980s, 
BACM, together with the Engineers’ and Managers’ Association and the 
British Air Line Pilots’ Association, set up a council within the TUC for 
those unions unaffiliated to the Labour Party. The intention was not simply 
to promote interests of professional and managerial staff within TUC, but 
also to share information, lobby government, and encourage other unions 
to merge with them. In part, as Greg Bamber notes of BACM (and other 
managerial unions), this was a response to rising costs and falling 
membership, increasing unemployment, and the anti-union politics of the 
Conservative government.111 It also built on discussions already taking 
place within BACM, and its collaboration with the NUM and NACODS over 
colliery closures.112  
 The TUC became an important forum for BACM to lobby on 
government energy policy. This was visible in its attempts to lobby 
against financial targets within the Coal Industry Act of 1985 (requiring 
the NCB to break even) – which BACM argued was ‘likely to cause further 
capacity closures and redundancies’ – and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board’s policy on ever lower coal prices, as well as review 
procedures for colliery closures.113 As the industry contracted so 
membership fell to 5,640 by 1993 (many of them retirees). In response, 
BACM created the Technical, Energy and Administrative Management 
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(TEAM) section to create BACM-TEAM (representing managers and 
engineers in the energy sector).114  
 To foster alliances to lobby for coal and protect the remaining jobs 
in the industry, BACM-TEAM found itself by the twenty-first century 
attempting to foster reconciliation between the NUM and the breakaway 
Union of Democratic Mineworkers. But concerns over factionalism 
prompted BACM to block Scottish branch attempts to affiliate to the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) and the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry), both key avenues for lobbying within policy-
making circles in Scotland. Though other white-collar unions (including the 
First Division Association) affiliated to the STUC, BACM never did. This 
was fraught with wider tensions over the rise of nationalist parties and 
campaigns for greater decentralization of power in Scotland and Wales, 
and public debates and dissatisfaction over the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’ (embracing both the labour movement and business interests) by 
the 1960s and 1970s.115  
 As with contests over cover for strike policy, debates over TUC 
affiliation reflected battles within the union – chiefly between the ‘mining 
group’ and allied professions – as much as the issue at hand. By the 
1970s, the pre-eminence enjoyed by colliery managers and mining 
engineers (though still controlling the NEC and NJC) was being challenged. 
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The diffusion of managerial functions also created further tensions. 
Capturing the changes within the union, Alistair Moore recounted the 
‘coup’ that saw the ‘mining group’ ousted from its dominant position in the 
Scottish branch, after which the colliery managers and mining engineers 
walked out en masse in protest: ‘Managers always thought … that they 
should be in charge and that other disciplines were subservient. If you 
like, they were lesser beings ... “This is our union, you have only pinned 
yourselves on. Therefore we should be in charge”.’116  
 Bullock and Tyler’s campaign, carried on by their successors, for 
TUC affiliation had taken over a decade to succeed. It exposed the deep-
seated tensions within BACM between branches and the national 
leadership, posing the fundamental quandary for managerial unions over 
whether they were a trade union or a professional association.  
 
Culture clash: BACM, MacGregor, and the road to privatization 
 
MacGregor’s appointment as NCB chairman marked a watershed. He had 
earned a brutal reputation at the British Steel Corporation (BSC) and had 
developed a ruthless attitude to trade unions and labour from his earliest 
days as a manager.117  Even before his appointment, BACM had voiced 
concerns about the Thatcher administration’s management of the 
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industry.118 In May 1983, BACM’s president, Schofield, stressed that 
MacGregor was there (as in BSC) to ‘run the industry down’.119 ‘Should it 
become obvious that his objective is to butcher the coal industry, then 
the membership of this association will not be with him.’120 In October, 
BACM signed an agreement with the NUM and NACODS to offer ‘all 
possible mutual support and assistance to prevent further rundown’.121 
 Animosity between BACM and MacGregor peaked during the 1984–
85 strike. This is little commented upon, or understood, in the dispute’s 
literature. By August 1984, NCB industrial relations director Ned Smith 
later recalled, MacGregor’s tactics and utterances were ‘bringing to a 
head a growing sense of fear and discontent, not to say disbelief’.122 In a 
meeting, with Jimmy Cowan, NCB deputy chairman, BACM declared that 
it ‘had lost confidence in the Board, in particular … the Office of the Chief 
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Executive’.123 By autumn, BACM was in open conflict with MacGregor. It 
confirmed that in the event of a breakdown of talks between NACODS and 
the NCB, and a resulting strike, BACM would not allow its members to 
cover miners working in defiance of the NUM.124 In the same month 
Weekes, NCB South Wales Area director, recorded: ‘The man has to go, 
and go soon.’125 An NCB insider who had returned to south Wales after 
stints as deputy director of the NCB staff college and in the east 
midlands, Weekes was considered fair and a good mining engineer by 
many, including on the left of the NUM South Wales Area.126 His 
opposition to MacGregor owed much to his identification with his ‘location’ 
socially and geographically (his native valleys), which needs to be 
understood in terms of the impact of the closure programme that were 
felt earlier in south Wales, Scotland, Durham and Northumberland.127 In 
November 1984, BACM declared MacGregor’s management of the 
industry a ‘disaster’: ‘that is not the way to run this industry, which is 
complex and has certain traditions that have to be known and 
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understood’.128 In the same month, the NCB public relations director 
Geoffrey Kirk took early retirement, observing of MacGregor: ‘he is 
unaccustomed to having people questioning his decisions and pointing out 
consequences’.129 BACM held a ‘torrid meeting with Cowan & MacGregor’, 
with Weekes noting after in his diary, ‘I am convinced that this pair of 
idiots is so inept that it wouldn’t be impossible to imagine a Third Front 
being opened’, referring to the possibility of BACM joining the strike, 
alongside the threat of NACODS action.130 The following month Smith 
publicly criticized MacGregor’s ‘balance sheet mentality’ to pit closures. In 
the wake of his departure, The Times reported: ‘Colleagues of Mr Smith 
argue privately that his resignation is just the tip of an iceberg of 
discontent at Hobart House, the board’s head office’.131 He was followed 
in February 1985 by Paul Glover, director of staff, and Ralph Rawlinson, 
technical director, leaving the national board with no experienced senior 
officials.132  
 The gulf between the chairman, and those in the industry’s 
management, was further widened by MacGregor’s decisions reached 
secretly with the government’s political advisers, without consulting his 
colleagues. Whereas in the steel industry, MacGregor had grown 
accustomed to the qualified support of managers and their union (SIMA), 
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he and BACM had developed a mutual and visceral dislike.133 Unlike his 
predecessors Ezra and  (briefly) Norman Siddall, MacGregor was an 
‘outsider’. In contrast to MacGregor’s close proximity to the Thatcher 
government, Ezra had deeply resented the interference of the Heath 
government in NCB negotiations with the NUM in the early 1970s.134  
In Scotland, where one of a number of bullish area directors, Albert 
Wheeler, had been installed, managers were divided over the strike.135 In 
the years immediately preceding, Wheeler sought to dismantle existing 
colliery-level negotiations and disrupt relationships between operational 
management and the NUM. This included replacing ‘local’ managers with 
outsiders, with a brief to sever agreements and enforce the new 
managerial prerogatives. At an Edinburgh meeting of mining engineers in 
1982, he excoriated them for taking the path of least resistance. Even 
before the strike, with an NUM overtime ban – in response to wage claims 
and closures – starting in November 1983, Wheeler (unlike his English and 
Welsh counterparts) refused to permit BACM members to support surface 
cover to allow NACODS members to undertake weekend safety and 
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maintenance work. Events reached a climax when BACM Scottish officials 
requested that their members be allowed to fulfill basic maintenance tasks 
(to prevent flooding and falls). In an act many viewed as tantamount to 
criminal negligence of ‘community resources’ – leading directly to the 
flooding of the Bogside complex and one of Scotland’s largest pits, 
Polkemmet – Wheeler refused and threatened to demote any BACM 
member undertaking such tasks. In Scotland, this narrative about ‘insider’ 
managers pitted against the ‘outsider’ Wheeler has been a common theme 
among both NUM activists and some managers. One retired Scottish 
BACM official appropriated MacGregor’s and Thatcher’s characterization of 
the NUM leadership, to refer to Wheeler as the enemy ‘within our 
ranks’.136 While suggesting different solutions to save the colliery, this was 
reflected in BACM’s defence of Polmaise 3 and 4 and Wilson’s public 
repudiation of Wheeler’s attempts to close the pit at a pit review meeting 
in March 1984.137 
Though pursuing a cautious line after the strike – recognizing its 
lack of power and the poor relations with MacGregor and the government 
– BACM made its views on closures and government policy clear, with 
general secretary Wilson declaring:  
There will also need to be an acceptance that social factors must be 
taken into consideration ... My fears stem principally from the external 
forces which I am sure from past experience can have such an impact 
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upon the industry. I refer to political philosophy and voices are already 
being raised in certain quarters suggesting more decentralisation and 
the privatisation of parts, if not all, of the coal industry.138  
Wilson lamented the exclusive focus exclusively on the strike’s ‘staggering 
financial cost [which] takes no account of the human cost – the legacy of 
bitterness, estranged families, broken homes, the lingering acrimony and 
the deep divisions within the NUM’.139 With a membership reluctant to 
strike, BACM had been peripheralized in negotiations with the NCB under 
MacGregor. During the dispute, managers occupied differing positions, 
some (such as MacGregor, Wheeler, Ken Moses and John Northard) 
ruthlessly pursuing a market logic, with others (most prominently 
Weekes) attempting to defend the ‘collective resources’ of the industry for 
mining communities and the nation couched in ‘moral economic’ 
arguments and a ‘local Keynesianism’.  
With the formation of the British Coal Corporation in 1987, BACM, 
in alliance with other mining unions, focused on resisting, and then 
mitigating the effects of, the breakup of the nationalized industry and 
further closures. It was afforded some support by the House of 
Commons Select Committee’s report on energy (1991). This highlighted 
the gross disparities in funding awarded to the nuclear industry over coal 
in crucial areas such as research and development (Department of 
Energy support for nuclear was 65% of R&D budgets compared to 2% to 
                                                        





the latter) and concluded that the market could not be relied upon for 
energy security.140 
Responding to news announcing the further contraction of the 
industry in September 1991, BACM ‘made it clear that whoever is 
thinking of such a strategy should not expect the management staff of 
the industry to co-operate in their own suicide’.141 It placed a motion 
before the TUC in 1991, including a pledge that the Congress support 
‘maintenance of a substantial British deep-mining coal industry’, and 
pledge to ‘have no confidence in any government that turns its back on 
coal’.142 Ultimately the union’s officers recognized the unrelenting 
political direction – given the earlier privatizations of British Gas, Britoil, 
BP, the regional electricity companies, and, in March 1991, the power 
generators PowerGen and National Power. BACM commented on an 
Adam Smith Institute conference on privatization attended by 
accountants, economists, corporate finance and lawyers: ‘My, how the 
vultures are circling’.143  
In response to the government’s selection of Rothschild to report 
on the future of the industry, and the leaking of the document’s dismal 
outlook to selected news outlets in September, BACM president Bulmer 
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was unequivocal: ‘These reports were commissioned by the Government 
as it wishes to privatise the industry’.144 Further, ‘The issue of 
privatisation has been overshadowed by the emergence of doubts over 
our continued existence.’145 He took a sideswipe at the intellectual 
apostle of privatization, the Institute of Economic Affairs economist, 
Stephen Littlechild, over the timing of electricity contracts and for 
privatization.146 In December 1992, Bulmer concluded: 
the Government’s underlying policy objective for coal has for a long 
time been to break the power of the NUM and to demonstrate the 
failure of public ownership. With its newly established reverse Midas 
touch [the recession of 1991–92] this objective has failed on both 
accounts …  From a national interest point of view, the policies pursued 
… have been negative regarding the coal industry. The scale of 
inequality of treatment is such that the Government should be required 
to demonstrate clearly why it took the decisions that it did. Long term 
strategic considerations seem to have been of no account.147  
What Bulmer, BACM and the other mining unions were witnessing (in a, 
by then, well-practised way) was the systematic discrediting of the 
                                                        
144 BACM, National News Letter (September 1991), p. 2. 
145 Ibid.  
146 Formerly an economics professor and member of the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, Stephen Littlechild was the chief architect of the deregulation of UK 
energy markets. He was UK energy regulator, 1989–98. BACM, National News 
Letter (March 1992), p. 2. 




industry and the dismantling of public-owned power generation and 
supply. Meanwhile, the mood in the coalfields, among managers (as with 
miners and deputies) was grim; the BACM branch secretary covering 
Scotland, the north-east of England and Yorkshire, reported of British 
Coal’s decision to suspend the colliery-review procedures in September 
1992: ‘At any other time, or in different circumstances, it would be 
pleasing to report … but I suspect that this is just the calm before the 
storm – or even before a hurricane.’148 Bill Marshall, a deputy manager, 
and between 1988 and 1991 a BACM Scottish branch committee member, 
remembers that going into work was like going into a ‘penitentiary’.149 
 BACM and the other mining unions organized lobbies, 
demonstrations and gained widespread support in their criticisms of the 
1992 colliery-closure programme. While acknowledging the ‘gratifying’ 
but belated ‘wave of public, media and political support’ and its effect in 
giving the industry a brief stay, BACM noted the inexorable moves to 
contract and privatize the industry: ‘all this is simply going through the 
motions in order to satisfy legislative and political requirements’.150 BACM 
had become a strident defender of nationalization and indeed a vocal 
critic of Conservative plans for the industry after 1979 – hardly surprising 
given the background of many managers, hailing from mining families 
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and communities and starting working lives as miners.151 Nationalization 
afforded managers tremendous individual opportunities and a collective 
voice. BACM continued to represent them through the final phase of 
colliery closures but in 2014 members voted overwhelmingly to join the 
Prospect trade union.  
 
Conclusion: reluctant trade-unionists 
 
BACM’s actions, and those of individual managers, demonstrate a more 
complicated position and range of opinions than portrayed in much of the 
literature. The union’s position from the 1970s was characteristic of that 
uncertainty. While the state acted as midwife to managerial unionism, 
frustration over centralized control and the industry’s contraction from the 
late 1950s significantly increased recruitment to BACM. It was 
transformed from a conservative staff association and reluctant partner in 
nationalization, as epitomized by its first national leaders, to an 
independent managerial trade union, as represented by Bullock and Tyler. 
From the 1970s, and especially the 1980s and 1990s, BACM’s leadership 
had to contend with the national strikes of 1972, 1974, and 1984–85, and 
the assault on the industry’s future and nationalization. This was shown 
by the confrontations with MacGregor. There was also considerable 
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tension between mining engineers and other BACM sections. In most 
respects, BACM fitted Blackburn’s model of ‘unionateness’ but managers 
(and BACM) occupied multiple ‘contradictory’ locations of exploitation.  
 Part of the challenge for Bullock, Tyler and their successors – as 
demonstrated over strike cover and TUC affiliation – was in managing 
sectional interests and branches, experiencing contraction and growth, 
against the UK’s shifting political economy of energy. Ultimately, BACM, 
the NUM and NACODS found common interest over the industry’s survival 
in a hostile environment. Some managers demonstrated a moral economic 
position in their commitment to the industry, and recognition of coalfield 
communities’ reliance on it for survival – collieries as collective resources 
upon which an occupational civilization relied. In part these differences 
reflected generational factors, social background and geographical 
location. 
 BACM’s actions in the 1980s and 1990s reflected the contested 
position that managers occupied in the nationalized British coal industry, 
when the fabric of mining communities was under threat. Notwithstanding 
the disappearance of the ‘village pit’, managers were still likely to be 
drawn from coalfield communities and have worked as miners. 
MacGregor, the aggressive outsider with no feel for the industry, was 
assaulting an industry and culture that they were drawn from and to 
which they had devoted their careers. Such responses call into question 
Brian McCormick’s  early suggestion that managers unquestionably 
remained wedded to their employers and Bain’s view that managerial 
employees were unaffected by social location or occupational identity. The 




economy of the coalfields.152 BACM’s position was a barometer of those 
contested and ‘contradictory’ locations; in this respect, the ‘outsider’ 
MacGregor recognized that. 
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